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INCONTESTABILITY STATUTE NULLIFIES
CONTRACT LANGUAGE: EQUITABLE LIFE
ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES V.
BELL 27 F.3d 1274 (7th Cir. 1994)
State legislators responded to numerous charges of corruption,
fraud, and dishonesty in the insurance industry' by passing
stricter regulations to police insurance companies.2 One such
regulation requires insurers to include incontestability clauses in
disability policies.3 Incontestability clauses state that after a
specified time an insurer may not deny or reduce benefits for a
disability caused by a condition existing before the effective date
of the policy. 4 While incontestability clauses are designed to
protect the insured5 and to reduce litigation, 6 insurance com-
I. See generally JANIc E. GREIDER & WmLiAm T. BEADLES, LAW AND
THE LIFE INSURANCE CONTiRACT 237 (1968) (discussing common abuses by life
insurance companies, including refusing to pay death benefits or offering to
settle claims for substantially less than the policy value).
2. See generally SHPARD B. CLOUGH, A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LwE
INSURANCE: A HISTORY OF THE MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CoMPANY OF NEW
YoRK 244-45 (1946) (discussing the number of states adopting regulations in
response to the improprieties in the insurance industry).
3. Several treatises have examined the debate over the conflicting interests
in the application of incontestability clauses. See generally IA JomN APPLEMAN,
INstRAN CE LAW AND PRACTICE § 311 (1981) (surveying the law of incontest-
ability clauses); 7 SAMUEL WILLITON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CONRACTS § 912 at 394 (3d ed. 1963) (comparing the interests
of the insured and insurer).
4. Historically, incontestability clauses have also included provisions re-
garding the effect of misstatements, either fraudulent or accidental, in the
application process prior to the issuance of the insurance policy. For general
discussion of the incontestability clause, see Eric K. Fosaaen, Aids and the
Incontestability Clause, 66 N.D. L. REv. 267 (1990) (recommending a re-
examination of incontestability clauses after the advent of AIDS); William F.
Young, Jr., "Incontestable" - As to What?, 1964 U. ILi:. L F. 323 (discussing
advantages of incontestability clauses); Note, The Incontestable Clause in
Combination Life Insurance Policies, 31 ILL. L. REv. 769 (1937) (discussing
the uncertainty caused by some incontestability clauses).
5. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Kaufman, 78 F.2d 398 (9th Cir.
1973) (holding that incontestability clauses are available to the honest seeking
their protection), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 626 (1935); Indiana Nat'l Life Ins.
Co. v. McGinnis, 101 N.E. 289 (Ind. 1913) (acknowledging that Indiana has
long recognized the validity and benefit of incontestability clauses); Rex Ins.
Co. v. Baldwin, 323 N.E.2d 270 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); see also infra notes
24-51 and accompanying text (discussing the various interpretations of incon-
testability clauses).
6. See, e.g., Columbian Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Wallerstein, 91 F.2d 351,
352 (7th Cir. 1937) ("The incontestability clause ... is in the nature of a
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panies have attempted to circumvent the clauses with language
limiting policy coverage for pre-existing conditions. 7 In Equitable
Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Bell,8 the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that under Indiana law,
a statutorily mandated incontestability clause in a disability
policy bars an insurer from denying a claim made more than
two years after the issuance of the policy on the grounds of a
pre-existing condition.9
In Bell, the plaintiff insurance company sought to avoid
paying disability benefits because the defendant's disabling ill-
ness manifested itself before the issuance of the policy. 10 The
insurer relied on policy language limiting coverage for pre-
existing conditions." The insured, Bell, responded by citing the
policy's incontestability clause. Bell stated that once the policy
was in effect for two years, Equitable could not deny a claim
for benefits even if the underlying condition existed before the
policy's effective date. 12 The district court rejected the argument
statute of limitation and repose."); Wischmeyer v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co.,
725 F. Supp. 995, 1000 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (noting that many states enacted
statutes requiring life, disability, and health policies to contain incontestability
clauses in order promote certainty and decrease litigation).
7. See, e.g., Neville v. American Republic Ins. Co., 912 F.2d 813, 815
(5th Cir. 1990) (holding that incontestability clause does not extend coverage
of policy to include a pre-existing condition); Button v. Connecticut Gen. Life
Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 1988) (allowing a challenge to a disability
claim, despite incontestability clause, because the policy did not cover pre-
existing conditions), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988). But see, e.g., McMackin
v. Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co., 99 Cal. Rptr. 227, 234-35 (Cal. Ct. App.
1971) (stating that pre-existing illnesses and injuries are irrelevant once the
contestability time has expired); Lindsay v. United States Life Ins. Co., 194
A.2d 31 (N.J. 1963) (holding that the incontestability clause requires insurer
to cover all pre-existing conditions).
8. 27 F.3d 1274 (7th Cir. 1994).
9. Id. at 1282.
10. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States v. Bell, 818 F.
Supp. 245, 246 (N.D. Ind. 1993). The court addressed a secondary issue
involving the incontestability clause and Bell's intentional misstatement of his
medical history. Because Equitable chose a version of the statutorily mandated
clause that did not refer to fraudulent misstatements, the court did not address
this issue at length. 27 F.3d at 1282-83. See infra note 16 (quoting the Indiana
statute that allows insurers to choose between two clauses). See also IA
APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 311 at 305-06 (discussing incontestability in cases
of fraud or misrepresentation by policy holders). For a case involving the
misstatement version of the incontestability clause, see Paul Revere Life Ins.
Co. v. Haas, 628 A.2d 772 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
11. The language within the policy limiting coverage read as follows: "This
policy will not cover any loss which is caused or contributed to by any of the
following: 1. injury occurring or sickness first manifesting itself prior to the
effective date of coverage under this policy. . . . " Bell, 27 F.3d at 1276.
12. The incontestability clause in the policy before the court read ashttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/9
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that the language of the disability policy 3 allowed Equitable to
withhold benefits and granted summary judgment in favor of
the insured. 14 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed, and held that under Indiana law the policy's
incontestability clause barred the insurer from denying benefits,
irrespective of the pre-existing sickness. 15
Indiana enacted legislation 16 requiring incontestability clauses
in health insurance policies to protect beneficiaries from unnec-
follows:
INCONTESTABILITY
(a) After this policy has been in force for a period of two years
of the lifetime of the Insured (excluding any period during which
the Insured is disabled), it shall become incontestable as to the
statements contained in the application.
(b) No claim for loss incurred or total disability (as defined in the
policy) commencing after two years from the Date of Issue of this
policy shall be reduced or denied on the ground that a disease or
physical condition had existed prior to the effective date of cov-
erage under this policy, unless, effective on the date of loss, such
disease of physical condition was excluded from coverage by name
or specific description.
Id.
13. The incontestability clause also included language regarding the effect
of misstatements on coverage. See infra note 16. The court of appeals did
not consider this portion of the clause to be a critical issue. Bell, 27 F.3d at
1276 n.1.
14. Bell, 818 F. Supp. at 252.
15. Bell, 27 F.3d at 1282.
16. Indiana Code § 27-8-5-3(a)(2)(A)&(B) requires that insurers insert the
first or second of the following clauses, in addition to the third, in all policies:
[I]TIME LIMIT ON CERTAIN DEFENSES: After three (3) years
from the date of issue of this policy no misstatements, except
fraudulent misstatements, made by the applicant in the application
for such policy shall be used to void the policy or to deny a claim
for loss incurred or disability (as defined in the policy) commencing
after the expiration of such three (3) year period.
IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-5-3(a)(2)(A) (Burns 1992).
[2]INCONTESTABLE: After this policy has been in force for a
period of three (3) years during the lifetime of the insured (ex-
cluding any period during which the insured is disabled), it shall
become incontestable as to the statements contained in the appli-
cation.
Id. § 27-8-5-3(a)(2)(A)(2).
No claim for loss incurred or disability (as defined in the policy)
commencing after three (3) years from the date of issue of this
policy shall be reduced or denied on the ground that a disease or
physical condition, not excluded from coverage by name or specific
description effective on the date of the loss, had existed prior to
the effective date of coverage of this policy.
Id. § 27-8-5-3(a)(2)(B). Equitable Life chose the incontestability clause for its
life insurance policy rather than the clause with the exception for fraudulent
misstatements. See supra note 12.
1995]
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essary litigation after the death of the insured. 17 The clause
adopted by the Indiana legislature was identical to the model
clause drafted by the National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners (NAIC) in 1946.18 The Indiana clause is consistent
with clauses used in other states that adopted the NAIC model
incontestability clause. 19 Despite applying similar laws, courts
disagree on the issue of whether an insurer may deny disability
benefits when a policy contains both an incontestability clause
and language excluding benefits for disabilities resulting from
pre-existing conditions. The majority position holds that incon-
testability clauses leave the insurer free to exclude coverage for
pre-existing2° diseases and conditions .2  The minority position
holds that incontestability clauses mandate coverage for disabil-
ities resulting from pre-existing conditions, irrespective of any
policy terms to the contrary.22
17. See Columbian Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Wallerstein, 91 F.2d 351, 353
(7th Cir. 1937).
18. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) drafted
the model incontestability clause statute based on New York's Standard Policy
language. New York developed its Standard Policy law containing an incon-
testability clause in response to the Armstrong Commission's findings regarding
the corruption in the insurance industry. See Fosaaen, supra note 4, at 268-
71 (describing the early development and spread of incontestability clauses).
19. Numerous other states have statutorily mandated incontestability clauses.
See, e.g., CAL. INs. CODE § 10206 (West 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 215,
para. 357.3 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IowA CODE ANN. § 509.2.2 (West 1988); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 40-420(2) (1986). See also Fosaaen, supra note 4, at 270-71
(describing the widespread adoption of the NAIC clause).
20. Many courts discuss at length the difference between "existing" and
"manifesting." The Seventh Circuit did not consider this distinction to be a
viable issue in the Bell case. Bell, 27 F.3d at 1283. For a lengthy analysis of
the distinction, see Massachusetts Casualty Ins. Co. v. Forman, 516 F.2d 425,
428 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 91A (1976).
21. See supra note 6. See also Keaten v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 648
F.2d 299, 301 (5th Cir. Unit 13 June 1981) (holding that under Georgia law,
after the contestability period has passed, an insurer may still deny any claim
if it is not within the terms of the policy); Forman, 516 F.2d at 428 (holding
that incontestability clauses do not cut off defenses relating to coverage);
Home Life Ins. Co. v. Regueira, 313 So.2d 438, 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (holding that incontestability clauses prohibit challenges to the validity
of the policy but not defenses relating to limitation of coverage).
22. See supra note 7. See also Manzella v. Indianapolis Life Ins. Co., 814
F. Supp. 428, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that under New Jersey law, once
the incontestability period has passed, no pre-existing conditions can be
excluded); Wischmeyer v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 725 F. Supp. 995, 1001-
02 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (holding that under Indiana law, if an insured's pre-
existing disability results in a claim arising after the contestability period
expires, an insurer may not defend on the basis of the pre-existing condition);
Fischer v. Massachusetts Casualty Ins. Co., 458 F. Supp. 939, 944 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (holding that under New York law, a policy defining covered conditionshttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/9
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The two federal appellate courts which examined the effect
of statutorily mandated incontestability clauses on pre-existing
condition clauses prior to the Seventh Circuit's Bell decision,
articulated the majority position.? In Massachusetts Casualty
Insurance Co. v. Forman, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that under Florida law, Massachusetts Casualty was
not liable for a disability resulting from a pre-existing condi-
tion.2, The court reasoned that the policy's incontestability clause
sheltered the insurer from liability for existing and known con-
ditions.? Because the insured's disability resulted from previ-
ously diagnosed diabetes,2 it fell outside the scope of policy
coverage. Thus, the court held that an incontestability clause
does not preclude insurers from refusing benefits on the ground
that a particular disability was never within the policy coverage. 27
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed the
reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Forman. In Button v. Connec-
ticut General Life Insurance, the Ninth Circuit held that under
Arizona law, the incontestability clause in Button's policy did
not preclude Connecticut General from refusing a claim on the
ground that Button had a pre-existing disease that contributed
to his disability. 8 The court reasoned that incontestability clauses
relate to the validity of the insurance contract and to its con-
struction. 29 Therefore, the court held that an incontestability
as those that first manifest themselves after coverage begins was not proper
exclusion by "name or specific description" under incontestability clause);
White v. Massachusetts Casualty Ins. Co., 465 N.Y.S.2d 345 (N.Y. App. Div.
1983) (holding that an incontestability clause precludes exclusion of pre-existing
illnesses through coverage provisions).
23. See Button v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins., 847 F.2d 584 (9th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988); Massachusetts Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Forman, 516 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 914 (1976).
24. Forman, 516 F.2d at 430.
25. Id. at 428.
26. Id. at 427. Not only had Forman's illness manifested itself, but he
was also hospitalized and disabled by diabetes prior to the issuance of the
policy. Id.
27. Id. at 428. The Forman court quoted Chief Justice Cardozo's opinion
in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway to explain its position:
The provision that a policy shall be incontestable after it has been
in force during the lifetime of the insured for a period of two
years is not a mandate as to coverage, a definition of the hazards
to be borne by the insurer. It means only this, that within the
limits of the coverage the policy shall stand, unaffected by any
defense that it was invalid in its inception, or thereafter became
invalid by reason of a condition broken.
Id. at 428-29 (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 169 N.E. 642,
642 (N.Y. 1930)).
28. Button, 847 F.2d at 588 (citing Carlson v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
222 N.E.2d 363, 368 (Ill. 1966)).
29. Button, 847 F.2d at 588.
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clause does not change the meaning of policy terms or enlarge
the policy's coverage.3 0
Although two federal circuits addressing the issue agree, state
courts are split on whether insurance companies may use pre-
existing condition clauses to deny benefits.3' For example, in
National Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Mixon,32 the Alabama
Supreme Court found no conflict between the statutorily man-
dated incontestability clause and the policy's pre-existing disease
exclusion.33 The court stated that an incontestability clause does
not extend the coverage of a policy to a disease contracted
before the issuance of the policy. 4 Thus, the clause did not
preclude the insurer from denying coverage simply because the
insured waited two years to claim disability benefits from a loss
of eyesight resulting from a pre-existing and diagnosed disease.35
Conversely, in Monarch Life Insurance Co. v. Brown, 6 the New
York Court of Appeals held that an incontestability clause in
the insured's disability policy barred the insurer from disclaiming
coverage for a disability resulting from a pre-existing heart
condition, notwithstanding a pre-existing condition clause. 37 The
court reasoned that any decision which allows insurance com-
panies to limit coverage for pre-existing conditions would render
the incontestability clause meaningless. 38 Because the legislature
would not have intended insurers to include a meaningless clause,
the only reasonable holding was to declare the pre-existing
condition clause invalid.3 9
Notwithstanding the majority position,40 some federal courts
have reached a contrary conclusion. For example, in Fischer v.
30. Id. at 589.
31. See infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text. See also Hooks v.
Colonial Life and Accident Ins. Co., 259 S.E.2d 567 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979)(holding that policy's incontestability clause did not bar insurer from raising
the defense that insured's physical condition prior to issuance of policy
contributed to his disability); Educators and Professional Life Ins. Co. v.
Jordan, 536 S.W.2d 124 (Ark. 1976) (holding disability policy did not cover
illness caused by culmination of the insured's osteomyelitis, notwithstanding
incontestability clause in the policy).
32. 282 So.2d 308 (Ala. 1973).
33. 282 So.2d at 316. The Alabama incontestability is essentially identical
to Indiana's. See ALA CODE § 27-18-4 (1986). Incontestability periods range
from one to three years. Id. In Mixon, the period was one year. 282 So.2d
at 310.
34. Mixon, 282 So.2d at 311.
35. Id. at 312.
36. 512 N.Y.S.2d 94 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
37. Id. at 103.
38. Id. ?
39. Id.
40. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text for an explanation ofhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/9
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Massachusetts Casualty Insurance Co.,41 the District Court for
the Southern District of New York acknowledged the abundance
of opposing case law but rendered a conflicting decision. 42 In
Fischer,43 the plaintiff filed a disability claim after the two-year
incontestability period expired. The Fischer court held that under
New York law, once the incontestability period expired the
incontestability clause precluded denial of benefits for a disa-
bility resulting from a previously diagnosed heart disease.4 The
court did not follow the majority position because the insurer
did not exercise its option under New York law, to exclude
specific illnesses from coverage.45
Some courts protect insureds even more than the Fischer
court.4 In Wischmeyer v. Paul Revere Life Insurance Co.,47 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
interpreted the state's incontestability clause as limiting an in-
surer's ability to deny benefits on the basis of a pre-existing
condition.4 A doctor diagnosed Wischmeyer with fibromyalgia
before the insurance company issued him a policy containing an
incontestability clause and a provision denying coverage for pre-
existing conditions.4 Wischmeyer delayed filing his disability
claim until the requisite two years had expired.5 0 The Wischmeyer
court held that under Indiana law, if the insured's pre-existing
the majority position. See also, e.g., National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v.
Chapman, 27 S.E.2d 157 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962) (holding that insurer could
defend a claim on the grounds that it fell outside the policy); John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Markowitz, 144 P.2d 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944)
(allowing insurer to assert the defense contained in the pre-existing disease
clause, notwithstanding the policy's incontestability clause); Perilstein v. Pru-
dential Ins. Co., 29 A.2d 487 (Penn. 1943) (holding that the incontestability
clause did not preclude recovery based on insured's suicide); Apter v. Home
Life Ins. Co. of New York, 194 N.E. 846 (N.Y. 1935) (construing incontest-
ability clause to apply only to the validity of the policy).
41. 458 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
42. Id. at 941-44.
43. Id. at 940.
44. Id. at 944.
45. Id.
46. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text (illustrating the expansion
of the incontestability clause).
47. 725 F. Supp. 995 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
48. Id. at 1004.
49. Id. at 997. The court discussed a second issue regarding possible
misrepresentations over income and medical history. Id. at 999.
50. Id. at 1002. The incontestability clause specifically excluded any time
the insured was disabled during the two-year incontestability period. The court
found that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the insured
was disabled within the two-year period during which insurer could contest
the disability policy pursuant to the incontestability clause. For this reason,
the court refused the insured's request for summary judgment. Id.
1995] 777
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disability results in a claim arising after the incontestability
period expires, the insurer may not avoid paying disability
benefits because the disability resulted from a pre-existing con-
dition.51 The court reasoned that the plain, unambiguous lan-
guage of the statute mandates that no claim be denied after two
years because of a pre-existing condition.5 2
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Bell"
provided the Seventh Circuit with the opportunity to determine
what affect the Indiana incontestability clause has on policy
provisions excluding pre-existing conditions.5 4 Because the In-
diana courts had not yet resolved the issue, 5 the court inter-
preted Indiana law.56 In doing so, the Seventh Circuit rejected
the majority position adopted by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.57
The Bell court held that the Indiana incontestability clause
prohibits an insurer, after a policy is in effect for two years,
from denying a disability claim because the underlying disease
or condition existed before the effective date of the policy,
regardless of whether the policy contains a pre-existing exclusion
clause.58 The court agreed with the Wischmeyer court's strict
51. Id. at 1001. The court outlined the mandate of the Indiana legislature
in establishing the incontestability clause as a three step sequence: "(1) If an
insured files a claim for disability; (2) And, if that disability began after two
years from the date of issue; (3) Then the insurer cannot deny the claim
because of a pre-existing condition." Id. The court further observed that the
legislature struck a balance:
The clause protects an insured who is'healthy enough to work
throughout the two-year period from losing the security of disa-
bility insurance because some prior condition might eventually
disable him. On the other had, the insurer is protected in that it
is not precluded from denying benefits to an applicant whose pre-
existing condition is so bad that he becomes disabled during the
two-year period.
Id. at 1001-02.
52. Id. at 1003.
53. 27 F.3d 1274 (7th Cir. 1994).
54. Id. at 1277.
55. In Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Rice, 52 N.E.2d 624 (Ind. 1944),
the Indiana Supreme Court was most recently faced an incontestability clause
issue. The court held that incontestability clauses in life insurance policies
limit the time within which matter affecting the validity of the policy may be
raised, and have no reference to whether a particular casualty subsequently
occurring is covered. Id. at 627.
56. Bell, 27 F.3d at 1277. Because the Indiana courts had not addressed
the issue, under Northern Assurance Co. of Am. v. Summers, 17 F.3d 956,
964 (7th Cir. 1994), the court had to predict how the Indiana Supreme Court
would resolve the issue.
57. Bell, 27 F.3d at 1281. The court noted that the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
ignored the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutorily mandated incon-
testability clause. Id.
58. Id. at 1281.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/9
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statutory interpretation and reasoned that to limit the incon-
testability clause by excluding diseases or conditions existing
before the issuance of the policy would be contrary to the
mandate of Indiana's legislature. 9 The court criticized the ma-
jority position for not applying the plain and ordinary meaning
of the incontestability provision. 60 Because the provision clearly
states that after two years the insurer cannot deny a claim on
the ground that an underlying disease or condition existed before
the policy became effective, the court reasoned that the policy
must include all pre-existing conditions, regardless of their time
of manifestation. 61
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Bell was correct for two
reasons: first, the court properly interpreted the plain language
of Indiana's incontestability clause and second, the court helped
equalize the positions of insurers and insureds. 62 The Indiana
legislature intended its clause to protect insureds against insurers
seeking to deny benefits for pre-existing conditions years after
issuing a policy.63 Rather than deny the insured the intended
protection of incontestability clauses, the court's decision pro-
motes certainty by assuring that insureds receive their contractual
benefits.M The court appropriately interpreted the incontestabil-
59. Id. at 1281-82. The court rejected Equitable's attempts to nullify the
protection of the incontestability clause by excluding from coverage an illness
that manifests itself before the policy is issued. Id. at 1282 n.8.
60. Id. at 1280-81. See supra note 12 for the full text of the policy's
incontestability clause.
61. Bell, 27 F.3d at 1281. The Bell court discussed potential criticisms of
its holding. In response to an argument that the meaning of paragraph (B) is
ambiguous when read in conjunction with the other provisions of the contract,
the court cited Wood v. Allstate Ins. Co., 21 F.3d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1994),
for the proposition that ambiguous insurance provisions are construed against
the insurer. 27 F.3d at 1282. The court also addressed the fact that its holding
tends to reward fraudulent misrepresentations by insureds. In response, the
court noted that, through Indiana law, insurance companies have an option
to select a "time limit on certain defenses" clause in lieu of the "incontest-
ability" provision. Companies then reserve the right to deny benefits on the
basis of fraudulent misstatements during the application process. Id. at 1283.
See supra note 16 (comparing Indiana's incontestability and "time limit on
certain defenses" clauses). Paying benefits to the few with pre-existing con-
ditions who successfully hide their illnesses until the end of the incontestability
period is a price insurers should pay when they select the more marketable
incontestability clause which omits the "fraudulent misstatements" exception.
27 F.3d at 1283.
62. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
court's analysis of Indiana's incontestability clause.
63. See WILLISTON & JAEGER, supra note 3, § 912 at 394 (noting that
incontestability clauses resulted from the early greed and ruthlessness of the
insurance industry).
64. See supra notes 5, 6, 17 and accompanying text for examples of the
problems alleviated by statutorily mandated incontestability clauses.
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ity clause in a plain and ordinary fashion and properly rejected
a position that permits insurance companies to liberally exclude
all pre-existing conditions from coverage.65 The court's holding
also furthers the policy of achieving a balance of power between
insurers and insureds.6 Instead of following the overreaching
holdings of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the Bell decision
provides both parties with the protection the Indiana legislature
intended them to have.67
The Bell court's holding arguably rewards insureds who make
fraudulent misstatements on their policy applications. The court
reasoned, however, that the legislature allowed insurers to reduce
the risk of fraud by excluding fraudulent misstatements from
incontestability clauses.6 " Furthermore, when insurers opt for
the more marketable incontestability clause without the exclu-
sion, the two year time period prior to incontestability69 is
adequate for diligent insurers to discover undisclosed pre-existing
conditions.
The Seventh Circuit's holding protects the insured from losing
the security of the expected benefits of disability insurance, 0
and like Fischer, preserves the insurer's option to name specific
conditions or physical disabilities that will not be covered. 7' This
position prevents insurers from relying on a general "all pre-
existing conditions" exclusion to withhold benefits years after
the issuance of a policy. 72
The Bell court properly gives the insured the protection in-
tended by state legislators. 73 By holding that insurers cannot
undermine incontestability clauses with policy language, the
court ensured that insured persons will receive expected bene-
fits.7 4 Unfortunately, not all courts have adopted the plain language
65. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text for the specific criticisms
of other interpretations of incontestability clause. See also supra notes 23-41
(discussing decisions allowing the exclusion of pre-existing conditions).
66. See supra note 51 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
balance of power.
67. See supra notes 6 and 17 and accompanying text for examples of other
problems alleviated by statutorily mandated incontestability clauses.
68. Bell, 27 F.3d at 1283.
69. See supra note 33 (discussing length of mandatory incontestability
periods ranging from one to three years).
70. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
impact of the Bell holding.
71. See supra note 51 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
power retained by insurance companies.
72. See supra note 61 (explaining the insurer's attempt to exempt all pre-
existing conditions from coverage).
73. See supra note 2 (discussing the intentions of state legislators).
74. See supra note 64 (discussing this aspect of the court's holding).
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interpretation of incontestability clauses.75 If more courts move
towards this standard, insured persons afflicted with pre-existing
conditions will not be precluded from receiving the benefits of
disability insurance.
Alexander B. Temel*
75. See supra notes 24-39; see also supra notes 52, 61 (discussing the plain
language interpretation).
* J.D. 1996, Washington University.
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